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The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative
divorce risks: Amatter of alternatives in partner choice?
André Grow , Christine Schnor and Jan Van Bavel
University of Leuven (KU Leuven)
Recent evidence from the United States suggests that the reversal of the gender gap in education was
associated with changes in relative divorce risks: hypogamous marriages, where the wife was more
educated than the husband, used to have a higher divorce risk than hypergamous marriages, where the
husband was more educated, but this difference has disappeared. One interpretation holds that this may
result from cultural change, involving increasing social acceptance of hypogamy. We propose an
alternative mechanism that need not presuppose cultural change: the gender-gap reversal in education has
changed the availability of alternatives from which highly educated women and men can choose new
partners. This may have lowered the likelihood of women leaving husbands with less education and
encouraged men to leave less educated spouses. We applied an agent-based model to twelve European
national marriage markets to illustrate that this could be sufficient to create a convergence in divorce risks.
Keywords: divorce; repartnering; marriage market; education; sex ratio; gender; assortative mating; agent-
based computational modelling
Introduction
Over the last few decades, Europe, North America,
and many other parts of the world have experienced
dramatic changes in the educational attainment of
women relative to that of men. Until the 1970s, uni-
versity education was mostly a domain of men, but
participation of women has steadily increased since
then. From around the 1990s, women have been sur-
passing men in terms of participation and success in
higher education (Schofer and Meyer 2005). One
consequence of this reversal is that long-standing pat-
terns of educational assortative mating have
changed. In most couples, the wife and husband
have similar levels of educational attainment (homo-
gamy). But, in the past, if there was a difference in
educational attainment, the wife tended to be less
educated than the husband (hypergamy). Today, if
there is a difference, the wife tends to be more edu-
cated than the husband (hypogamy) (Esteve et al.
2012, 2016; Grow and Van Bavel 2015; De Hauw
et al. 2017). The reversal of the gender gap in edu-
cation is also likely to affect many other aspects of
family life (Van Bavel 2012). In this paper, we
explore how it may affect divorce risks, in particular
among marriages in which spouses differ in their edu-
cational attainment.
Earlier studies have shown that marriages in which
the wife was more educated than the husband were
less stable, giving rise to the concern that the increas-
ing prevalence of hypogamy might increase the
divorce rate (see Schwartz and Han 2014 for a
review). However, Schwartz and Han (2014)
showed that among recent cohorts in the United
States (US), hypogamous marriages no longer
exhibit a higher divorce risk than other marriage
types. The authors suggested that this convergence
might be the result of changing norms and family
values. Hypogamy used to be uncommon and vio-
lated the norm that a husband should have a higher
socio-economic status than his wife, in line with the
male breadwinner family model. In recent years, as
women’s educational attainment has increased and
their market participation has continued to expand,
family values have become more egalitarian. This
may have rendered hypogamy less non-normative
and may have reduced the threat that a more edu-
cated spouse posed to a man’s male identity.
We propose a different mechanism that may also
lead to a convergence in the divorce risks of
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hypogamous and hypergamous marriages, without
the need to assume that norms and family values
change. Our argument draws on the macrostruc-
tural-opportunity perspective on divorce, which high-
lights the availability of spousal alternatives as an
important factor in divorce decisions (South et al.
2001). Research from this perspective builds on two
central assumptions. First, individuals tentatively
remain on the marriage market, even after marriage,
and potentially leave their partner when they
encounter more attractive marital alternatives.
Second, the likelihood of people encountering
marital alternatives increases if there is an oversup-
ply of opposite-sex members on the marriage
market. Together, these assumptions imply that the
divorce rate increases if the sex ratio on the marriage
market is imbalanced (South and Lloyd 1992, 1995;
South 1995; South et al. 2001).
We investigated the implications of this mechanism
when the sex ratio is specified by the educational
attainment of potential mates. Research has consist-
ently shown that educational attainment is an impor-
tant dimension in mate selection (e.g., Kalmijn 1991;
Lewis and Oppenheimer 2000), and the gender-gap
reversal in education implies a declining ratio of
highly educated men to highly educated women.
Combined with the assumptions of the macrostruc-
tural-opportunity perspective, this can be expected
to have implications for divorce risks, by affecting
the number of attractive alternatives that people
can choose from for repartnering. The likelihood of
a highly educated woman who is married to a less
educated man encountering an alternative with
more education than her partner has substantially
decreased over recent decades. Conversely, the like-
lihood of a highly educated man who is married to a
less educated woman encountering a more educated
alternative has increased. The divorce risk of hypoga-
mous marriages may therefore have decreased,
whereas the divorce risk of hypergamous marriages
may have increased.
The foregoing reasoning appears intuitive, but the
link between the marriage market and divorce pat-
terns is more complex. One factor is that people’s
divorce decisions are highly interdependent (Chiap-
pori and Weiss 2006). For example, individuals who
are single or divorced are more easily available for
repartnering than individuals who are married (see
Stauder 2006). Thus, if the marriage market contains
many married individuals, people will be less likely to
meet alternatives who are easily available for repart-
nering than when fewer people are married. To deal
with such complexities, we made use of agent-based
computational modelling and drew on the model of
educational assortative mating developed by Grow
and Van Bavel (2015).
Agent-based modelling makes it possible to study
two-sided partner search (in which the marriage
market behaviour of both men and women needs
to be considered simultaneously) by explicating the
behavioural principles and interactions that underlie
mate choice. This helps to alleviate some of the pro-
blems that other approaches to the study of two-
sided partner search often face (for a discussion of
some of these problems, see Willekens 2010).
Agent-based modelling is a form of discrete-event
simulation. As such, it is mathematically and compu-
tationally identical to demographic microsimulation.
However, agent-based models traditionally have a
stronger focus on studying the implications of theor-
etically motivated rules for individual behaviour and
interactions, whereas microsimulations have a stron-
ger focus on creating population projections based
on empirical transition rates (Richiardi and Richard-
son 2016). This greater focus on theoretically motiv-
ated rules makes agent-based modelling attractive
for the study of complex social dynamics, particularly
when important actions and decision processes are
largely unobservable, as is often the case with mate
choice (Zinn 2016).
For the analysis reported in this paper, we
extended the model by Grow and Van Bavel
(2015). The original model was developed to study
the link between the gender-gap reversal in edu-
cation and assortative mating, and Grow and Van
Bavel (2015) calibrated it to match observed patterns
of educational assortative mating among cohorts
born between 1940 and 1980 across twelve European
countries. Although the original model was not
developed with a focus on union stability, its assump-
tions about mate search and divorce are congruent
with the assumptions that underlie our argument.
This makes the model particularly attractive for our
purposes. For the study of divorce, we adjusted two
central aspects of the model. First, we traced each
marriage that was formed, recording information
such as the educational characteristics of the
spouses, the simulation year in which the marriage
was formed, year of dissolution, and reason for dis-
solution. The original model did not trace marriages;
instead, it only focused on individual agents and their
union status at a given point in time, as well as the
characteristics of their partners (if they were part-
nered). Second, we relied on more realistic assump-
tions about fertility and mortality. The original
model assumed that population size remained con-
stant over time and that the risk of death increased
with age at the same rate for both sexes. The
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average life expectancy of men is lower than that of
women and this can lead to a skewed sex ratio, par-
ticularly among older individuals (Dyson 2012).
This, in turn, may affect their repartnering opportu-
nities; we therefore addressed this issue by employ-
ing empirical fertility and mortality rates to
generate more realistic age structures in our artificial
populations.
We explored the proposed mechanism with data
on the marriage market structure of the countries
studied by Grow and Van Bavel (2015), for marriages
formed between 1950 and 2004. For simplicity, we
limited our analysis to heterosexual marriage and
did not include non-marital cohabitation. We are
aware that cohabitation has been on the rise in
recent years and that the stability of cohabiting
unions is often lower than that of marriages
(Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Schnor 2015). We
assume, however, that the proposed mechanism
would apply to both marriages and cohabitations.
In what follows, we first present the basic assump-
tions of the macrostructural-opportunity perspective
and discuss the role that educational attainment plays
in mate choice. Subsequently, we describe the model
and the design of our computational experiments. We
close with a discussion of our results and their impli-
cations for future research. Our results suggest that
the gender-gap reversal may indeed lead to a conver-
gence in the divorce risks of hypogamous and hyper-
gamous marriages, by affecting the availability of
marital alternatives from which people can choose.
This convergence occurs even if we assume that the
values and norms that surround family formation
do not change. Yet, as discussed in the conclusion,
the proposed mechanism can exist alongside mech-
anisms based on normative change and may even
reinforce them.
The availability of marital alternatives and
divorce
The assumption that marriages may dissolve when at
least one partner encounters a more attractive
alternative is consistent with the concept of marital
bargains. This concept holds that ‘[j]ust as trading
relationships dissolve when one of the parties
locates a more profitable trading partner, many mar-
riages dissolve when one of the spouses locates a
more attractive marital partner’ (South et al. 2001,
p. 744). Yet, individuals do not always leave their
partner when they meet a more attractive alternative.
One important reason for this is the existence of part-
nership-specific investments, such as common
children and shared house ownership (Stauder
2006). These tend to increase the commitment to
the current partner. Another reason can be legal
structures or normative pressures that can make
divorce less feasible and subjectively costlier (see
Guttentag and Secord 1983; South and Lloyd 1995).
However, even if such ‘barriers’ to separation exist,
there is typically at least some chance that people
will leave their spouse when they meet a more attrac-
tive alternative (Farber 1964; Levinger 1976; Becker
et al. 1977).
If there are potentially more appealing alternatives
on the marriage market, why would people marry a
less attractive partner in the first place? Theories of
marital search explain this with the uncertainty that
partner search involves (England and Farkas 1986;
Oppenheimer 1988). Men and women have specific
preferences for the characteristics of their mates
but they cannot know exactly if and when they will
find the ideal partner. The less favourable the mar-
riage market conditions are, the more difficult it
becomes to find an attractive partner. The more
time people have already invested in the search
process, the riskier it becomes to pass up on potential
spouses, given that the pool of available alternatives
shrinks and their own market value decreases with
age. This is particularly the case among women,
given that they are judged more by youthful appear-
ance than men (England and McClintock 2009).
Therefore, individuals tend to lower their aspirations
and become willing to accept partners who are ‘less
than perfect’ as they grow older (Lichter 1990).
Even if marriage market conditions are favourable,
people may still partner with a less than perfect
mate, if they invest little in mate search and settle
for a partner early (see South 1995).
The macrostructural-opportunity perspective high-
lights that the real or perceived likelihood of people
encountering attractive marital alternatives is partly
determined by the numerical availability of oppo-
site-sex members (South and Lloyd 1995). In a mar-
riage market in which women outnumber men, men
face a large pool of potential spouses and would
therefore be more likely to encounter a more attrac-
tive alternative than when there is gender parity in
numbers. As a consequence, they would be more
likely to opt for divorce. The same applies to
women when they are outnumbered by men.
Empirical evidence from the Western context
largely supports the hypothesis of the macrostruc-
tural-opportunity perspective (Udry 1981; White
and Booth 1991; South and Lloyd 1992, 1995;
South et al. 2001; Rapp et al. 2015). For example,
Udry (1981) showed that among husbands and
The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative divorce risks S17
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wives the mere perception that there are many
attractive alternatives (assessed through survey
items) is associated with an increase in divorce
risks. Similarly, using the sex ratio in the local mar-
riage market as a more objective measure of mate
availability, South and Lloyd (1995) demonstrated
that an oversupply of either sex is associated with
an increase in divorce risks. One exception is a
study by Lyngstad (2011), who found that in
Norway an imbalanced sex ratio is associated with
lower divorce risks. As an explanation, Lyngstad
suggested that married people are more aware of
the risk of divorce when their spouse faces many
marital alternatives and they therefore increase
their commitment and make concessions to maintain
the marriage. Lyngstad’s data do not allow for
inspecting this mechanism and the opportunity-
based mechanism separately, but it is possible that
both operate simultaneously. So far, most of the
existing evidence suggests that the opportunity-
based mechanism tends to dominate.
Educational attainment and the
attractiveness of marital alternatives
Early marriage market studies have focused on age
as an important determinant of mate attractiveness
(e.g., Glick and Landau 1950). More recent research
has also highlighted the importance of people’s cul-
tural and economic resources (see Kalmijn 1998;
Lewis 2016). Cultural resources include ‘values and
behaviours, such as child-rearing values, political atti-
tudes, cultural literacy, taste in art and music, and
styles of speech’ (Kalmijn 1994, p. 426). Similarity
in such values and behaviours can lead to mutual
reinforcement of world views, generate feelings of
social confirmation, and facilitate the organization
of joint activities within couples. As a consequence,
people often prefer partners with similar cultural
resources (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985). Economic
resources, such as income and property, produce
economic well-being and status. Such resources are
typically shared within couples and people therefore
tend to prefer partners with high economic resources,
as this can improve their own economic well-being
and status (Kalmijn 1994).
Education encompasses both economic and cul-
tural aspects. It is commonly assumed to be ‘the
most important determinant of occupational success
in industrialized societies [… and] it reflects cultural
resources influencing individuals’ preference for
specific partners’ (Blossfeld 2009, p. 514). This link
with economic and cultural resources is one reason
why education is an important factor in mate selec-
tion and can explain why men and women tend to
prefer spouses with a similar level of education to
themselves and to prefer more educated spouses
over less educated spouses. A spouse with a similar
level of education is attractive because of the likely
similarity in cultural resources, but a more educated
spouse may also be attractive because of the higher
economic resources that often come with higher edu-
cational attainment. A less educated spouse, by con-
trast, is less attractive given the lack of similarity in
cultural resources and the lack of economic
resources.
Modelling the link between the gender-gap
reversal in education and divorce
Our model is a two-sex model (see Willekens 2010)
that simulates mate search over the life courses of
several cohorts of people (agents). Agents are
born, grow older, enter school, enter the marriage
market, leave education, reproduce, and die at
some point. The model makes three assumptions
that are central for our purposes: (1) individuals
have preferences for mates with certain character-
istics and can choose to leave their partner when
they encounter a more attractive alternative; (2)
the similarity in cultural resources that comes with
similarity in education, and the economic resources
that come with high education, increase the attrac-
tiveness of the available alternatives; and (3) the like-
lihood of people encountering attractive alternatives
is largely determined by the structure of the marriage
market.
The model takes into account the fact that edu-
cation is usually associated with cultural and econ-
omic resources. In line with earlier research
(Kalmijn 1994), it approximates people’s cultural
resources by their educational level and their econ-
omic resources by their lifetime earnings prospects.
Thus, agents feel attracted to opposite-sex members
who are similar to them in educational attainment,
but they also feel attracted to those who have high
earnings prospects. Education and earnings pro-
spects are positively correlated, but this correlation
differs between men and women. Furthermore, the
model also considers age to be an important determi-
nant of mate attractiveness. It assumes that men feel
most attracted to women who are in their mid-20s
(other things being equal), whereas women feel
most attracted to men who are slightly older than
themselves (England and McClintock 2009; Skopek
et al. 2011).
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Agents enter the marriage market and start
looking for a spouse when they have reached a mar-
riageable age (at 16 years). The search takes the form
of meetings with opposite-sex members who are
drawn randomly from the marriage market. The
model considers that the educational system tends
to structure the daily activities and meeting opportu-
nities of adolescents and young adults. In particular,
while in education, people have an increased likeli-
hood of interacting with those who are currently
attending at the same educational level (Mare
1991). Thus, agents progress through the educational
system and, as long they are in education, they are
more likely to meet somebody who is currently
attending at the same educational level, rather than
somebody who is attending at a different level or
has left education already.
Whenever two agents meet, both need to decide
whether they want to start dating; agents who are
dating need to decide whether they want to marry.
These decisions are modelled probabilistically,
based on the assumptions of maximizing and risk-
averse behaviour. That is, agents become more
likely to accept each other for dating and marriage,
the more attractive they perceive each other to be.
Yet, agents’ aspirations for the attractiveness of
their partner decrease as they grow older, given
that for both men and women the pool of alternatives
usually shrinks with age. This means that in the
model, younger agents are more selective in choosing
a mate than older agents. This decrease in selective-
ness with age is stronger among women, given that
their attractiveness to men tends to decrease with
age (see Lichter 1990; England and McClintock
2009).
The model accounts only for divorce caused by
repartnering. It does not consider divorce for other
reasons, such as relationship problems (Amato and
Previti 2003). Thus, agents tentatively remain on
the marriage market, even after marriage, and con-
tinue to meet opposite-sex members. If they encoun-
ter an alternative that is more attractive than their
current partner, there is a chance that they choose
to divorce and repartner. Both the likelihood of
agents meeting somebody new and of them leaving
their current partner decrease with the length of
their current relationship, representing the effect of
partnership-specific investments that increase over
time (see Stauder 2006).
We implemented the model in NetLogo (Wilensky
1999) and the code can be obtained from https://
www.openabm.org/model/5105, together with a
more detailed model description (Appendix A) and
results of supplementary analyses to determine the
number of simulation runs that were necessary to
obtain reliable results (Appendix B).
Agent characteristics
The model proceeds in discrete time steps and all
time-related elements are expressed in these steps.
Ten time steps represent one simulation year. Each
agent, i, can be described by their gender, gi (1 =
male or 2 = female); age, ai (measured in time
steps); the highest educational level that they will
ever attain, si (1 = no education, 2 = primary edu-
cation, 3 = secondary education, or 4 = tertiary edu-
cation); earnings prospects, yi (expressed in five
ordered categories); educational enrolment status,
ri (1 = not in the educational system yet, 2 = in
primary education, 3 = in secondary education, 4 =
in tertiary education, or 5 = finished education);
relationship status, li (1 = single, 2 = dating, 3 =
married, or 4 = divorced); the time they have
already been in a relationship with their current
partner, ci (measured in time steps); and the ideal
age they prefer in a partner, ui (expressed in time
steps). Table 1 provides an overview of all agent vari-
ables and Table 2 provides an overview of all other
model parameters. The parameter values shown in
Table 2 are based on the calibration experiments
reported in Grow and Van Bavel (2015), subject to
some adjustments to align them with the new input
data that we describe later.
Agents’ states of gi, si, and yi are assigned when
they enter the simulation at birth and remain stable
over their life course. Their states of si and yi are
assigned probabilistically, contingent on their
gender and birth year, based on empirical input
data (see details later).
Agents’ initial states of ai, ri, li, and ci are also
assigned when they enter the simulation, but these
states can change over their life course. Agents’
ages (ai) are initialized as zero and increase by one
at the end of each time step. Given that ten time
steps represent one simulation year, agents age by
one year every ten time steps. Each agent’s relation-
ship status (li) is initialized as single and is updated
every time they start a new relationship, get
married, break up with their current date, get
divorced, or their partner dies. Correspondingly, the
length of their current relationship (ci) remains at
zero for as long as they are single or divorced and
increases by one at the end of each time step from
the moment they start dating. This increase continues
when a dating relationship turns into a marriage.
Every time agents experience a break-up (after
The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative divorce risks S19
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dating) or divorce (after marriage), or when their
partner dies, the value of ci is set to zero. An
agent’s educational enrolment status (ri) is updated
as they progress through the educational system,
based on the age thresholds shown in Table 3.
Every time agents reach the age at which they exit
one stage (Aex, r) and enter the next (Aen, r), the
value of ri is updated accordingly. Agents leave edu-
cation once they have finished the level that corre-
sponds with their state si. The only exceptions are
agents with si = 2 (primary education), who tran-
sition from primary to secondary education and
leave school at age 16 (ai = 160). This takes into
account the fact that a minimal number of years in
Table 1 Overview of agent variables
Variable Description States
gi Gender 1 =male
2 = female
ai Age Time steps: [ {0, 1, . . . , Amax}
si Educational attainment 1 = no education
2 = primary education
3 = secondary education
4 = tertiary education
ri Educational enrolment status 1 = not in the educational system yet
2 = in primary education
3 = in secondary education
4 = in tertiary education
5 = finished education
li Relationship status
1 1 = single
2 = dating
3 =married
4 = divorced
ci Duration of current relationship Time steps: [ {0, 1, . . . , Amax − 160}
ui Ideal age that agent i prefers in a partner
2 Time steps: [ {0, 1, . . . , Amax + 25}
(for male agents fixed at 240, for female agents equal to ai + 25)
yi Earnings prospects [ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
1In contrast to Grow and Van Bavel (2015), we added the category ‘divorced’ to identify agents who have experienced divorce but not yet
repartnered.
2ui is denoted ai in Grow and Van Bavel (2015).
Note: Ten time steps represent one simulation year; for example, a value of 160 represents 16 years.
Table 2 Overview of model parameters
Parameter Description Values in experiments
I Total number of agents in the initial population1 1,000
Aen,r, Aex,r Age at which agents enter and exit a given educational level r See Table 3
Amarr Age at which agents enter the marriage market 160
Smax Maximal educational attainment of agents 4
Ymax Maximal earnings prospects of agents 5
Amax Maximal age of agents
2 1,100
wms , w
f
s Importance that male and female agents attach to similar education of partners 0.934, 0.385
wmy , w
f
y Importance that male and female agents attach to high earnings prospects of partners 1.025, 1.201
wma , w
f
a Importance that male and female agents attach to the age of partners
3 6.887, 14.895
bm, bf Commitment parameter for male and female agents 0.015, 0.015
sm, sf Age pressure parameter for male and female agents 0.0015, 0.0030
d Structuring effect of the educational system 0.9
1In contrast to Grow and Van Bavel (2015), we increased the number of agents from 500 to 1,000 to increase the number of observations per
run, given that divorce happens less often than marriage.
2In contrast to Grow and Van Bavel (2015), we increased the value of Amax = 800 to 1,100, to make full use of the age range covered by the
empirical mortality rates that we used.
3Because of the increase inAmax compared with that used in Grow and Van Bavel (2015), we have multiplied the original values ofwma andw
f
a
by 1,100/800 = 1.375. In this way, we were able to consider values of ai . 800, without altering the functional relationship between ui − aj and
vij for values of ai ≤ 800, as defined by Grow and Van Bavel.
Note: Ten time steps represent one simulation year; for example, a value of 160 time steps represents age 16.
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the educational system is usually mandatory for those
who participate in education (e.g., adolescents often
have to attend secondary school for some years,
even if they do not complete this level successfully).
Agents with si = 3 (secondary education) stay in
education until age 19 (ai = 190) and then leave the
educational system, whereas agents with si = 4 (ter-
tiary education) transition to college/university at
this age and stay at this level until age 24 (ai = 240).
Finally, agents are also assigned the age that they
prefer in a partner (ui) when they enter the simu-
lation. For male agents, this value remains fixed at
age 24 (ui = 240) over their entire life course. For
female agents, ui is updated at each time step, so
that they always prefer partners who are 2.5 years
older than themselves (ui = ai + 25).
Partner preferences
Partner choice is based on the overall attractiveness
that a given agent, i, perceives in another agent, j.
This attractiveness is expressed in a single number,
the mate value vij. It combines information about
the attractiveness of j in terms of educational attain-
ment (representing cultural resources), earnings pro-
spects (representing economic resources), and age.
Earlier research suggests that low attractiveness in
one or more important partner characteristics
cannot easily be substituted with high attractiveness
in other characteristics (Li et al. 2002; Li and
Kenrick 2006). In the literature on multi-criteria
decision-making, such interdependence between cri-
teria is often expressed by multiplicative exponential
weighting functions (introduced by Cobb and
Douglas 1928), and the model uses such a function
to determine vij. Its form is
vij = Smax − |si − sj|Smax
( )ws yj
Ymax
( )wy Amax − |ui − aj|
Amax
( )wa
(1)
where Smax, Ymax, and Amax define the maximal edu-
cation, earnings prospects, and age that agents can
reach and the parameters ws, wy, and wa govern
how much agents ‘penalize’ deviations from their
ideals in each dimension. The value of vij can vary
continuously between zero and one. The value of
vij comes closer to one, the more similar i and j are
in their educational attainment, the higher the earn-
ings prospects of j are, and the closer j is to the age
that i desires in a partner (ui). Deviations from
these ideals decrease the value of vij, and this
decrease is stronger at higher values of ws, wy,
and wa.
Table 2 shows that male (m) and female ( f ) agents
differ in the weight they attach to each of the three
mate characteristics (ws, wy, and wa). The parameter-
ization implies that females penalize deviations from
the ideal age more than males. This is in line with the
observation that, as men grow older, they tend to
marry women who are increasingly younger than
themselves, but also increasingly further away from
the ideal age of 24 years (implying a higher toler-
ance), whereas women tend to marry men who are
two to three years older, regardless of their own
age (implying a lower tolerance) (see England and
McClintock 2009). The parameterization also
implies that female agents attach relatively more
importance to economic resources than to similarity
in cultural resources (represented by earnings pro-
spects and educational attainment, respectively).
Male agents, by contrast, attach similar importance
to both dimensions. This is in line with the notion
that in the past, women often had less access to econ-
omic resources than men and therefore often
attached more importance to the economic potential
of their partners (Becker 1981). Evidently, this gap in
financial resources has decreased with the increase in
women’s educational attainment relative to that of
men and with the parallel increase in labour force
participation of females (see England 2010). Also,
there is some evidence that differences between
men’s and women’s partner preferences have some-
what decreased in recent years (Zentner and Eagly
2015). Yet, a considerable gap often still exists in
spouses’ incomes to the disadvantage of women
Table 3 Overview of ages at which agents transit between educational levels
Educational level r Aen,r Aex,r
Not in the educational system yet 1 0 60
In primary education 2 60 100
In secondary education 3 100 190
In tertiary education 4 190 240
Notes: r is the educational enrolment status; Aen,r is the age at which agents enter a given enrolment status; Aex,r is the age at which agents
leave a given enrolment status. Ten time steps represent one simulation year; for example, a value of 100 represents ten years of age.
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(Klesment and Van Bavel 2017) and empirical
research suggests that women still tend to attach
more importance to economic resources in their part-
ners than men do (e.g., Li and Kenrick 2006; Hitsch
et al. 2010).
Earlier agent-based models generally used a single
value to represent how attractive one agent perceives
another agent overall. However, many of these
models did not explicitly model the individual
characteristics from which this overall attractiveness
was derived (e.g., Simão and Todd 2002, 2003).
Those models that explicitly modelled these charac-
teristics (e.g., French and Kus 2008; Hills and Todd
2008) typically added or averaged the attractiveness
that was derived from different characteristics. The
model by Grow and Van Bavel (2015) was, to the
best of our knowledge, the first to implement non-
additive interdependence between central partner
characteristics, as discussed earlier in this subsection.
Partner search
We consider two stages of partner search: (a) ‘not
seeking a spouse’; and (b) ‘seeking a spouse’. The
latter stage involves the actual search process (gov-
erned by equations (2), (3a), and (3b) presented in
this subsection), as well as dating, marriage, and
divorce decisions (governed by equations (4) and
(5) presented in the next subsection).
From the moment agents are born, they are in the
stage of not seeking a spouse and they remain in this
stage until they reach the age of 16 years. At this
point, they enter the marriage market and start
looking for a spouse (Amarr = 160). This transition
is irreversible and agents remain in this stage for
the rest of their lives, even after they have married
(but their search effort can decrease, as described
later), which is in line with the assumptions of the
macrostructural-opportunity perspective. Further-
more, partner search takes place irrespective of
agents’ educational enrolment status (that is, agents
who are in education and those who have left edu-
cation already engage in similar search processes).
Agents who are in the stage of seeking a spouse
and currently have no partner invest full effort into
finding a spouse, whereas agents who already have
a partner reduce this effort, contingent on the
length of their relationship. This is consistent with
the observation that the number of contacts that
men and women have with opposite-sex members
tends to decrease with relationship length (Rapp
et al. 2015). The search effort is represented by the
probability that agents will actively seek out an
opposite-sex member in a given time step. It is deter-
mined as
Pr(i seek) = e−(cib). (2)
In equation (2), β is a ‘commitment parameter’ that
governs the effect that the length of i’s current
relationship has on the probability that the agent
will try to meet somebody. For single and divorced
agents, ci is always zero and the probability that
they will seek out somebody is thus always one. As
Table 2 shows, the value of β is positive and is the
same for male and female agents, and equation (2)
therefore implies that an agent’s inclination to seek
out alternatives to their current partner decreases
exponentially with the length of their current
relationship and approaches zero after about 25–30
simulation years. This is inspired by the observation
that few divorces occur after more than 25–30 years
of marriage (see Kulu 2014). Note that Pr(i seek)
can never become zero; yet, for technical reasons,
values between zero and 10−324 are considered
equal to zero in the simulation. Earlier agent-based
models of partner search have made similar assump-
tions about how the length of a relationship affects
agents’ search efforts (e.g., Simão and Todd 2002,
2003).
If agent i is seeking a partner in the current time
step, an opposite-sex member, j, is selected randomly
from one of two sets of marriage market members:
agents who have the same educational enrolment
status as i (i.e., ri = rj), or agents who have a different
educational enrolment status (i.e., ri = rj). The prob-
ability with which each set is chosen is determined by
the ‘structuring parameter’ δ (0≤ δ≤ 1), so that
Pr(ri = rj) = d (3a)
and
Pr(ri = rj) = 1− d. (3b)
The closer the value of δ is to one, the more likely
agents are to meet somebody with the same edu-
cational enrolment status; conversely the closer the
value of δ is to zero, the more likely agents are to
meet somebody with a different enrolment status.
In both cases, j is randomly selected from all agents
in the respective set. As Table 2 shows, the chosen
value for δ (0.9) implies that while in education,
agents mostly encounter people who are currently
attending at the same educational level. Conversely,
agents who have left education already are most
likely to meet agents who also have left education.
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Dating, marriage, and divorce decisions
Whenever two agents meet, they need to decide
whether they want to start dating. Dating can lead
to marriage and marriages can end in divorce if
agents meet an alternative who is more attractive
than their current partner and who also wants to
start dating them. Thus, in the model, divorce is
always the result of repartnering.
More specifically, whenever agent imeets an oppo-
site-sex member j, both assess each other’s mate
value (i.e., vij and vji, respectively) and use this
value to decide whether they want to start dating
the other. For illustration, we focus here on the
decision process from i’s point of view. If agent i
has no partner (i.e., li = 1 or 4), they perceive any
opposite-sex member as a potential spouse and
therefore always consider dating j. By contrast, if i
is currently dating or married (i.e., li = 2 or 3), they
consider as a potential spouse only those j whose
mate value is higher than that of their current
partner, k. If i encounters such an alternative, there
is a chance that they choose to leave (if i is dating)
or divorce (if i is married) their current partner. For-
mally, the probability that i is willing to date j (and to
leave or divorce their current partner, k, if they have
one), is determined by
Pr(i willing to date j)
1− e−(aivijs) if (li = 1 or 4)
(1− e−(aivijs))e−(cib) if (li = 2 or 3) and vij . vik
0 if (li = 2 or 3) and vij ≤ vik
⎧⎨
⎩
(4)
where σ governs the ‘age pressure’ that agents
experience when looking for a partner as they
become older. The first line of equation (4) implies
that for agents who have no partner, their willingness
to start dating j increases with j’s mate value and with
i’s age (assuming that s . 0). The second line implies
that if agent i has a partner, k, and if the mate value of
the alternative, j, is higher than that of k, i’s willing-
ness to date j (and to leave k for this) is attenuated
by the length of their current relationship with k, as
indicated by ci (assuming that b . 0). Yet, as the
third line indicates, if i has a partner, k, and if the
mate value of j is lower than, or equal to, that of k,
then i will not consider starting to date j. Finally,
two agents only leave or divorce any current partners
and start dating each other when both are willing to
date. This implies two independent decision pro-
cesses, in which equation (4) is applied separately
to i and j.
The longer agents have already been dating their
current partner, the more willing they become to
marry and therefore to propose marriage to or
accept a marriage proposal from their partner.
When agent i (or k) proposes marriage to their
current partner, k (or i), the proposal remains
intact until k (or i) agrees to marry, or until one of
them terminates the relationship or dies. They get
married at the moment both agree to marry. The
probability that agent i proposes to k, or is willing
to accept a proposal from k, is calculated as
Pr(i proposes/accepts marriage with k)
= (1− e−(aiviks))(1− e−(cib)). (5)
The first term of equation (5) holds that agents are
more likely to propose marriage to or accept a mar-
riage proposal from their partner, the higher the
mate value of their partner (vik) and the older they
are (ai), assuming that there is some age pressure
(s . 0). This parallels the notion implemented in
equation (4), that the more attractive an individual
finds a given opposite-sex member, the less hesitant
they are to form a committed relationship, and the
notion that the older they are, the less hesitant they
will be to form such a relationship in general. The
second term holds that as the length of the relation-
ship (ci) increases, i becomes more likely to
propose marriage to or accept a proposal from k
(assuming that b . 0). This is achieved by subtract-
ing e−(cib) (which is exponentially decreasing in ci if
b . 0) from one. Like equation (4), this implements
the notion that relationship-specific capital tends to
increase with relationship length, which renders
outside alternatives less attractive and makes individ-
uals less hesitant to form a permanent bond.
As Table 2 shows, in these decision processes
female agents experience a stronger age pressure
(σ) than male agents. This implements the notion
that both men and women have access to a smaller
pool of alternatives as they grow older, but women
suffer an additional penalty owing to men preferring
women who are in their mid-20s, which increases
women’s pressure to find a partner while young
(see England and McClintock 2009).
Note that the ways in which the model implements
effects of agents’ age, relationship status, and
relationship length on their willingness to start
dating a given opposite-sex member are similar to
implementations in earlier models of partner search
(e.g., Simão and Todd 2003; Hills and Todd 2008).
Note further that we have adjusted the original
model by Grow and Van Bavel (2015), so that
every time two agents marry, a unique marriage
record is created that provides information about
the characteristics of the spouses and the year in
which the marriage was formed. When the two
agents separate or one of them dies, the year of
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dissolution is added to the record, including the dis-
solution reason (i.e., divorce or death of one
partner).
Fertility and mortality
As indicated earlier, we adjusted the model pre-
sented in Grow and Van Bavel (2015) to incorporate
empirical fertility and mortality rates (see sources in
the next section) that enabled us to model annual fer-
tility rates among female agents aged 12–55 years
(ai ≥ 120 and ai ≤ 550) and annual mortality rates
among all agents aged 0–110 years (ai ≥ 0 and
ai ≤ 1,100). These rates translate into country-,
period-, gender-, and age-specific probabilities for
giving birth and dying that are applied to each
agent at the beginning of each simulation year. We
assume that 105 males are born for every 100
females (Guilmoto 2012), so that there is a 0.512
probability that a new born agent is male.
Experimental set-up and measures
The model in Grow and Van Bavel (2015) used
empirical data and projections provided by the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/
Vienna Institute of Demography (IIASA/VID)
(Lutz et al. 2007; KC et al. 2010) and the European
Community Household Panel for initializing agents
in terms of educational attainment and earnings pro-
spects in twelve European countries. Figure 1 shows
trends in the sex ratio among the highly educated at
age 30–49 years between 1970 and 2015 in these
countries, based on the IIASA/VID data. The
figure illustrates that, in most countries, there used
to be many more men than women with higher edu-
cational attainment. Yet, over time, the number of
women with higher educational attainment increased
relative to that of men. By 2015, in most countries the
sex ratio among the highly educated was either
balanced or the imbalance had turned to the favour
of women. Sweden is the only country in which the
sex ratio was already balanced in 1970, and
Germany is the only country in which highly edu-
cated men still outnumbered highly educated
women in 2015. Hence, the input data capture the
reversal of the gender gap in educational attainment.
For our analysis, we also used data obtained from
the Human Fertility Database (2016)/Human Ferti-
lity Collection (2016) and the Human Mortality
Database (2016) to implement realistic fertility and
mortality rates (see Appendix A at https://www.
openabm.org/model/5105 for more details). The
combined data enabled us to study mate search
under plausible marriage market conditions over
the period 1921–2012 in the twelve countries shown
in Figure 1. We focused on the dissolution risk for
marriages formed between 1950 and 2004, and the
simulation period covered the years 1921–2064. We
chose 2064 as the stopping year to avoid problems
associated with possible censoring among later mar-
riage cohorts. We used the input data from the year
2012 in all subsequent simulation years.
We focused on the share of marriages in a given
marriage cohort that had dissolved by the end of
the simulation runs. We were particularly interested
in the relative divorce risks of hypogamous vs. hyper-
gamous marriages and assessed this by
R = A
B
(6)
whereA andB refer to the average shares of hypoga-
mous and hypergamous marriages that had dissolved
across runs. On this measure, a value larger than one
indicates that hypogamous marriages are more likely
to dissolve than hypergamous marriages; a value
smaller than one indicates that hypogamous mar-
riages are less likely to dissolve; and a value of one
means that there is no difference in the likelihood
of divorce.
We measured the structure of the marriage market
in which divorces occurred with the F-index pro-
posed by Esteve et al. (2012). This index expresses
the educational advantage that women have in a
population as the probability that any randomly
selected woman will be more educated than any ran-
domly selected man. Accordingly, a higher F-index
value indicates a higher educational advantage of
females. The measure is calculated as
F = p
f
4(p
m
3 + pm1+2)+ pf3pm1+2
1− (pf1+2pm1+2 + pf3pm3 + pf4pm4 )
(7)
where pmsi and p
f
si refer to the proportions of men and
women who belong to each category of si. The
measure ranges from zero to one. A value of zero
indicates that no woman is as educated as, or more
educated than, any man; a value of one indicates
that no man is as educated as, or more educated
than, any woman; and a value of 0.5 indicates that
men and women are educated to a similar level on
average. We calculated F for a given year based on
the IIASA/VID data and focused on men and
women in the age range 20–49 years, given that this
is typically the prime age for (re)marriage. Note
that in equation (7) (and all other calculations
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reported in the results), educational categories ‘1’
and ‘2’ are combined, given that category ‘1’ was vir-
tually empty in most countries and years.
All results are based on averages obtained from
1,000 independent simulation runs per country (see
Appendix B at https://www.openabm.org/model/
5105 for an analysis to determine this number of
runs). Each run was preceded by a burn-in phase of
600 simulation steps to ensure that agents who
started looking for a partner at the beginning of the
main simulation phase did so in a plausible marriage
market (see Appendix A at https://www.openabm.
org/model/5105 for details).
Results
Figure 2 plots the average shares of marriages that
had dissolved by the end of the simulation runs
across countries by marriage cohort and marriage
type. About 13 per cent of all marriages ended in
divorce and this value tended to increase from
about 12 per cent in the 1950–54 marriage cohort,
to a maximum of about 14 per cent among marriages
formed in 1985–89. By comparison, according to
Eurostat (1997), the share of marriages that had
formed in 1960 and ended in divorce across selected
European countries was 14 per cent, ranging from
2 per cent in Spain to 29 per cent in Denmark. For
marriages formed in 1980, this value had increased
to 27 per cent, ranging from 7 per cent in Italy to
46 per cent in Sweden. Evidently, this comparison
with empirical data is complicated by the fact that
the model only considers divorce due to repartner-
ing, whereas not all divorces occur because of a
third person. Even with data on reasons for
divorce, a comparison is difficult, because there can
be multiple reasons involved in a given divorce
decision and concerns for social desirability may
lead to under-reporting of marital infidelity and
new relationships. However, the existing evidence
suggests that the model outcomes are plausible. For
example, Amato and Previti (2003) found in a longi-
tudinal survey of US couples that marital infidelity
was reported as one reason for divorce among
about 22 per cent of couples that had divorced.
Figure 1 Sex ratios among highly educated individuals aged 30–49 years in twelve European countries, 1970–
2015
Notes: Selected countries are Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece
(GR), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK); the selection is
based on Grow and Van Bavel (2015). The y-axis is log-transformed, so that a given ratio and its inverse are shown at the
same distance from the equal numbers case (i.e., from number of men/number of women = 1). High education is operatio-
nalized as ISCED-97 5–6, comprising the first (e.g., bachelor’s degrees) and second stages (advanced research qualifications,
e.g., PhD degrees) of tertiary education.
Source: Own calculations based on the global educational trend scenario in the reconstructions and projections of educational
attainment by country, year, gender, and five-year birth cohort provided by the IIASA/VID.
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Considering that in the US about 50 per cent of all
first marriages end with separation or divorce
within 20 years (Copen et al. 2012), this implies that
about 11 per cent of first marriages end in divorce
because of a third person.
Figure 2 shows that couples in homogamous mar-
riages were least likely to experience divorce,
although their divorce risk slightly increased up to
the 1985–89 marriage cohort. Like the empirical
trends reported by Schwartz and Han (2014) for
the US, in our simulations hypergamous marriages
were less likely to dissolve than hypogamous mar-
riages in early marriage cohorts, but this difference
decreased in more recent cohorts and disappeared
by the 2000–04 marriage cohort.
Figure 2 shows averages across the countries and
masks between-country variation. Figure 3 shows
the results separately for each country and focuses
on the relative divorce risk (R). In many countries,
the value of R started above one in early marriage
cohorts and approached one in later cohorts. In
Denmark, Finland, and Portugal, R even became
lower than one. This means that relative to hyper-
gamous marriages, the divorce risk for couples in
hypogamous marriages tended to decrease over suc-
cessive cohorts and, in some countries, hypogamous
marriages even became less likely to divorce than
hypergamous marriages. Sweden is the only
country in which the divorce risk of hypogamous
marriages was lower than that of hypergamous mar-
riages in all cohorts. But even this already low rela-
tive risk decreased over successive cohorts. The
only countries that did not show a clear decrease
in R were Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK);
this is most likely caused by the fact that the
changes in the sex ratio among the highly educated
were smallest in these countries, as can be seen in
Figure 1.
The results suggest that we might expect the
divorce risks of hypogamous and hypergamous mar-
riages in Europe to converge and we argue that this
could result from changes in women’s educational
attainment relative to that of men. To assess this
more directly, we needed to measure the structure
of the marriage market in which divorces had
occurred. This measurement is complicated by the
fact that even if two marriages have formed at the
same point in time, they may have dissolved at differ-
ent points in time, and therefore under different con-
ditions. To deal with this issue, we used the average
time from marriage to divorce as a reference for
approximating the structure of the marriage market
in which divorces had occurred.
Figure 4 shows the shares of marriages that had
dissolved across all simulation runs by marriage dur-
ation. The distribution shows a right skew, as also
observed in empirical research (e.g., Kulu 2014).
The overall average was around 3.6 simulation
Figure 2 Average shares of different marriage types that had ended in divorce by the end of the simulation
runs, by marriage cohort; simulations for twelve European countries combined
Note: We first calculated the mean shares for the different marriage types that had dissolved across runs within countries and
then calculated the averages of these means across countries.
Source: Own calculations based on the outcomes of our main simulation experiment.
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years, decreasing from around 4.1 to 3.3 years
between the 1950–54 and 2000–04 marriage
cohorts. A comparison with empirical data is also dif-
ficult here. Stauder (2006), for example, reported for
his representative sample of the German population
aged 18–55 years in 2000, that unions that had dis-
solved and involved immediate repartnering by the
respondent lasted between 3.0 years (among those
born after 1965) and 5.2 years (among those born
up to 1965). Yet, Stauder did not distinguish
between marital and non-marital unions and the
data only included unions that had lasted at least
one year. Similarly, repartnering was only considered
when the follow-up relationship had lasted at least
one year. Despite this caveat, the comparison
suggests that the model outcomes are plausible.
To assess the relevant marriage market structure,
we calculated the F-index for each marriage cohort
one to five years after marriage. For example, for
marriages formed in 1950–54, we calculated F for
the year 1955. Given that the IIASA/VID data
only provide information from 1970 onwards, we
approximated the F-index for 1955, 1960, and
1965 with the data from 1970, focusing on the age
groups that would have been 20–49 years of age
in the respective year. Figure 5 plots the association
between F and R for each marriage cohort in each
of the twelve countries. As female agents became
increasingly more educated than male agents (i.e.,
as F increased), the risk that hypogamous marriages
dissolved, compared with hypergamous marriages,
decreased (i.e., R decreased). This supports our
argument.
Figure 3 Relative divorce risk (R) for hypogamous (sm , sf ) vs. hypergamous (sm . sf ) marriages, by marriage
cohort; simulations for twelve European countries
Notes: We first calculated the average shares of different marriage types across runs within countries and then used these
averages to calculate R. The y-axis is log-transformed, so that a given ratio and its inverse are shown at the same distance
from the equal risk case (i.e., from R = 1).
Source: As for Figure 2.
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Figure 4 Shares of marriages that had ended in divorce by marriage duration; all simulation runs for twelve
European countries combined
Source: As for Figure 2.
Figure 5 Relative divorce risk (R) for hypogamous (sm , sf ) vs. hypergamous (sm . sf ) marriages and edu-
cational advantage of females (F-index); simulated for twelve European countries and eleven marriage cohorts
Notes: We first calculated the average shares of different marriage types across runs within countries and then used these
averages to calculate R for each marriage cohort. The y-axis is log-transformed, so that a given ratio and its inverse are
shown at the same distance from the equal risk case (i.e., from R = 1).
Source: The relative divorce risk is based on the outcomes of our main simulation experiment; the educational advantage of
females is based on the global educational trend scenario in the reconstructions and projections of educational attainment by
country, year, gender, and five-year birth cohort provided by the IIASA/VID.
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The association shown in Figure 5 may result from
a decrease in the absolute divorce risk among hypo-
gamous marriages, an increase in the absolute
divorce risk among hypergamous marriages, or a
combination thereof. Figure 6 assesses these alterna-
tive processes by plotting the shares of hypogamous
and hypergamous marriages that had dissolved
against the F-index, separately by country. The
figure suggests that the driver of the convergence in
divorce risks varied across countries. In one group
of countries (Germany, Denmark, Finland, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, and Sweden), increases in the edu-
cational advantage of women reduced the divorce
risk among hypogamous marriages and increased it
among hypergamous marriages. In a second group
(Belgium, Spain, France, and Greece), the divorce
risk increased among both marriage types, but this
increase was stronger among hypergamous mar-
riages than among hypogamous marriages. Only in
Ireland and the UK, was there no clear difference
in the association between F and the divorce risks
of the different marriage types.
Finally, the model distinguishes between individ-
uals’ cultural and economic resources, represented
by agents’ educational attainment (si) and earnings
prospects (yi). This makes it possible to assess the
effects that preferences for each resource have on
divorce risks. To this end, Figure 7 compares the out-
comes of the basic model with the outcomes of two
alternative versions of this model: one in which simi-
larity in education does not affect mate attractiveness
(i.e., wms = wfs = 0) and one in which earnings pro-
spects do not affect mate attractiveness (i.e.,
wmy = wfy = 0). In the model without educational pre-
ferences, the relative divorce risk (R) decreased over
successive cohorts, but the intercept was lower and
the slope flatter than in the basic model. One expla-
nation for this is that without educational preferences,
the effect that the gender-gap reversal in education
has on divorce risks occurs indirectly, via agents’ pre-
ferences for earnings prospects, which are correlated
Figure 6 Average shares of hypergamous (sm . sf ) and hypogamous (sm , sf ) marriages that had ended in
divorce and educational advantage of females (F-index), by country; simulated for twelve European countries
and eleven marriage cohorts
Notes: Trend lines are based on ordinary least square regression models. We first calculated the mean shares for the different
marriage types across runs within countries and then calculated the averages of these means across countries.
Source: As for Figure 5.
The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative divorce risks S29
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
U 
Le
uv
en
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
1:3
7 2
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
with educational attainment, and therefore the effect
is weaker. In the model without preferences for earn-
ings prospects, the slopewas similar to that of the basic
model, but the intercept was lower and R fell below
one in the 1970–74 marriage cohort. One explanation
for this is that earnings prospects and education are
imperfectly correlated and that the earnings distri-
bution is usually more compressed among women
than amongmen (see England 2004). In the complete
model, some highly educated female agents may thus
have had an ‘incentive’ to leave a less educated spouse
for another less educated spouse, as long as the new
spouse had higher earnings prospects. For highly edu-
catedmale agentswhohad a less educated spouse, this
was less likely to happen, given that there is less vari-
ation in the incomes of less educated women. These
differences, in turn, are likely to hamper the decrease
in the divorce risk of hypogamous marriages com-
pared with hypergamous marriages.
Discussion and conclusion
The gender-gap reversal in education has had impor-
tant consequences for patterns of educational assor-
tative mating. In this paper, we have explored some
of the consequences that it may have had for patterns
of divorce. The results of our simulation experiments
suggest that an increase in the educational attain-
ment of women relative to that of men may lead to
a convergence in the divorce risks of hypogamous
and hypergamous marriages. The results also
suggest that this convergence could occur even if
men and women did not have a preference for simi-
larity in cultural resources with their partners. Fur-
thermore, the relative divorce risks of hypogamous
and hypergamous marriages might invert, if men
and women did not care about the economic
resources of their spouses.
The mechanism that we have described focuses on
the interplay between people’s partner preferences
and changes in the structure of the marriage
market. It does not consider that the norms that sur-
round family formation may have changed over time,
as suggested by Schwartz and Han (2014). Yet, it
seems possible that our opportunity-based mechan-
ism could reinforce the norms-based mechanism
described by Schwartz and Han. Schwartz and Han
suggested that the number of hypogamous marriages
has increased over the years partly because the
number of highly educated women has increased
relative to that of men. This may have rendered
Figure 7 Relative divorce risks (R) of hypogamous (sm , sf ) vs. hypergamous (sm . sf ) marriages, simulated
for twelve European countries, by marriage cohort and model version
Notes: We first calculated the average shares of different marriage types across runs within countries and then used these
averages to calculate R. The y-axis is log-transformed, so that a given ratio and its inverse are shown at the same distance
from the equal risk case (i.e., from R = 1).
Source: Own calculations based on the outcomes of our sensitivity simulation experiment.
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this type of marriage less deviant and thereby
decreased normative pressures that may affect the
divorce risk among hypogamous couples. Our mech-
anism could strengthen this process, by reducing the
likelihood of hypogamous couples divorcing, com-
pared with the likelihood of hypergamous couples
divorcing. This may further reduce the non-norma-
tive character of hypogamous marriages and
thereby further reduce their divorce risk. Future
research could assess this possibility by introducing
marital satisfaction as an additional factor in
divorce decisions in the model, where low satisfac-
tion could trigger divorce even in the absence of
marital alternatives. The marital satisfaction of
spouses could, in turn, be modelled endogenously
with respect to the share of marriages that have
similar or different educational characteristics to
their own union.
As well as norms, the model also neglects a
number of other factors that may impinge on
divorce decisions. One of the most important
factors is the presence of young children, which has
been shown to reduce the divorce risk of couples con-
siderably (Lyngstad and Jalovaara 2010) and to
reduce the likelihood of remarriage among divorced
individuals (Ivanova et al. 2013). If hypogamous and
hypergamous marriages differ in their fertility behav-
iour, this could affect differences in their relative
divorce risks and could thus affect the mechanism
that we have explored. Future research should there-
fore extend the model to include such individual- and
couple-level factors that may lead to systematic
differences in divorce risks between hypogamous
and hypergamous marriages, to assess the robustness
of the dynamics that we have described.
The mechanism described in this paper potentially
applies to all unions, including non-marital cohabita-
tion, which has become more prevalent in recent
decades. Yet, one issue that may arise in this
respect is that cohabiters are often less committed
than married people, which leads to a higher dissol-
ution risk (Forste and Tanfer 1996). This could
affect the proposed mechanism if couples with
certain educational combinations are more likely to
opt for cohabitation than others. Future empirical
research should therefore disentangle marriages
and cohabitations when exploring the relation
between the gender-gap reversal and dissolution
risks, to take possible variation in commitment by
union type into account.
Finally, our results also offer a new explanation for
the increasingly negative educational gradient in
divorce risks among women that has been observed
in Western countries over recent decades (Härkönen
and Dronkers 2006). According to our model, the
gender-gap reversal in education may have reduced
the divorce risk among highly educated women in
hypogamous marriages, while increasing the divorce
risk among less educated women in hypergamous
marriages. This may explain at least in part why the
average divorce risk among highly educated women
has decreased relative to the divorce risk among
less educated women.
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